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CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Hon. George C. Pratt*:
We start out with Professor James Kainen, Associate Professor
of Fordham Law School who is going to address problems of
character evidence. Professor Kainen.
ProfessorJames L. Kainen**:
My subject is the admissibility of evidence of a victim's violent
character when offered by a defendant to defeat a charge of
homicide or assault by establishing that he acted in self-defense.
The admissibility of such evidence is different under the Federal
Rules of Evidence and New York State law. Its analysis provides
the occasion to explain and evaluate the differences, and finally,
to say some things about how to think about character evidence
generally, whether under state or federal law.
First, just to explain the difference in state and federal law
requires some background on character evidence generally. As
you may recall, state and federal law start with the proposition
that proof of a person's character or trait of character is not
admissible to show action on a particular occasion except in very
limited circumstances. 1 Thus, the general prohibition of character
* The Honorable George C. Pratt is a full-time Professor of Law at
Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. Judge Pratt was appointed to
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in 1976
and served there until 1982 when he was appointed to his current position seat
as Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
** Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See FED. R. EvID. 404. Rule 404 provides:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of
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proof prohibits a jury from hearing evidence that would enable it

to draw an inference that we often draw in our everyday lives;
people are apt to act in conformity with their character traits. It
prohibits what the idea of relevance alone would otherwise
allow. 2 Evidence of a trait of character to prove action in
conformity with that trait is relevant, but it is nonetheless

inadmissible except in limited circumstances. Evidence that a
person has an aggressive disposition, for instance, would be
relevant to show that he acted aggressively on a particular

occasion. Proof of the disposition makes it more likely that he
acted aggressively than it would be without the evidence.
Although relevant under state and federal law, the evidence is
excluded as improper character proof unless it falls into limited
3
exceptions.
The next step is to look at the exceptions to the general rule

excluding character evidence to prove action in conformity.
When can you properly establish a trait of a person's character as
proof that he or she acted in conformity on a particular occasion?
the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of the person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of
the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Id.; see also People v. Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d 241, 401 N.E.2d 199, 425
N.Y.S.2d 77 (1980) (holding evidence of prior uncharged criminal conduct
inadmissible as part of People's direct case, unless it pertains to specific aspect
of People's case other than propensity of accused to commit crimes).
2. See FED. R. EvID. 401. Rule 401 states that: "'Relevant Evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." Id.
3. See supra note 1. New York does not recognize the exception
embodied in Rule 404(a)(2). See infra notes I!-12 and accompanying text.
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Here, New York and Federal law are alike in at least recognizing
two categories of exceptions, 4 although they differ on specifics
about what falls into each category. 5 We may call the two
4. See FED. R. EVID. 404 (a)(1) and (2) (allowing character evidence for
parties to a crime) and FED. R. EVID. 404 (a)(3) (allowing evidence of
witnesses' character). In New York, see People v. Pavoa, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 451
N.E.2d 216, 464 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1983) (admitting character evidence probative
of witnesses' credibility) and People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N.Y. 408, 82 N.E.
718 (1907) (admitting evidence probative of criminal defendant's character).
5. As to substantive character evidence, see supra note 4 for differences.
For credibility proof, compare People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314
N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974) (holding that trial judge may admit
prior acts of violence, viciousness, or immortality for purpose of impeaching
defendant's credibility) with Rule 608 and Rule 609, which more specifically
targets character for truthfulness or mendacity. Rule 608 provides:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of an
opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence
may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2)
evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of
the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation
evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness'
credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to
which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
FED. R. EVID. 608. Rule 609 provides:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that
an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if
the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of
the punishment.
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categories credibility and substantive character evidence. The
first category - credibility - permits one to prove that a witness in
the proceeding possesses some character trait that bears on the
likelihood that his testimony at the proceeding is false. Here we
are talking only about a character trait that bears on the
truthfulness of testimony - permitting the inference of action in
conformity from the trait to the giving of truthful or false
testimony. In the second category - substantive character
evidence permitted by exception to the general character
prohibition - we are talking about permitting the action in
conformity inference from a character trait to some action that is
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not
admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date
of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement
imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction
more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of
intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence
of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or
other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the
person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a
subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a
pardon, annulment or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of
innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is
generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a
criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness
other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible
to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue
of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not
render evidence of a conviction admissible. Evidence of the pendency of
an appeal is admissible.
FED.

R. EvID. 609.
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relevant because it relates to the substantive allegations in the
case.
Under the federal rules, substantive character evidence is
permitted when it pertains to the character of a criminal
defendant and when it is offered by the defendant in a criminal
case or by the prosecution to rebut that evidence. 6 The same is
true under New York State law. 7 But the federal rules also allow
the defendant to introduce evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of a victim, 8 and once admitted, they also allow the
prosecution to rebut the evidence. 9 For our present purposes, that
exception in Rule 404(a)(2) permits a criminal defendant in a
homicide or assault prosecution to prove that the victim was an
aggressive person to establish a claim of self-defense. Thus, the
defendant could prove the victim's aggressive or violent character
and argue that it establishes that the victim was the first aggressor
or, if not, that the victim had responded to the defendant's
aggression with such disproportionate force as to justify the
defendant's response.
Based largely on a venerable 1904 case, People v. Rodawald,10
New York law does not recognize an exception to the character
evidence bar when a defendant seeks to prove the character of a
victim for aggression. The recent Second Circuit case of Williams

6. See FED. R. EvID. 404 (a)(1), supra note 1; see also United States v.
Hegwood, 977 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that prosecution may offer
rebuttal character evidence once defendant opens the door), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2348 (1993).
7. See People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N.Y. 408, 82 N.E. 718 (1907)
(holding that evidence probative of criminal defendant's character is
admissible); People v. Araronowicz, 125 A.D.2d 682, 683, 509 N.Y.S.2d
869, 870 (2d Dep't 1986) (holding criminal defendant has -absolute and
unqualified rights" to introduce evidence of good character to raise inference
of innocence regardless of whether defendant takes the stand).
8. FED. R. EvID. 404 (a)(2), supra note 1.
9. See supra note 1.
10. 177 N.Y. 408, 70 N.E. 1 (1904) (holding that evidence of decedent's
general reputation for violence admissible only if defendant had knowledge of
it at time of the homicide, but inadmissible to establish such by proof of
specific acts).
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v. Lord11 illustrates the continued vitality of that rule. In
Williams, the court observed that New York courts, relying on
common law traced back to Rodawald, had excluded evidence
that a victim of a homicide had, on an earlier, unrelated occasion,
raped a woman at knife-point after using drugs. 12 The defendant
sought to use this evidence to corroborate her claim that she had
stabbed the victim in self-defense after he had similarly attempted
to rape her at knife-point in a drug-induced state. 13 Ruling on a
subsequent habeas petition, the Second Circuit found that the
New York rule excluding the proof did not violate the
defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. 14 Thus,
Williams not only illustrates that Rodawald remains the law in
New York, it also shows that the New York rule passes
constitutional muster. There is no constitutional imperative
requiring that a defendant be allowed to prove the aggressive
character of a victim in a homicide or assault prosecution when it
may bear on the defendant's claim of self-defense.
If we look at the reasons that the Second Circuit gave for
finding that there was no violation of the defendant's
constitutional right, we can work our way back to some bases for
the particular New York approach. For one thing, the court noted
that New York is allowed to make a policy decision to exclude
this kind of proof because there might be some prejudice were
the proof to be admitted. 15 Everyone is entitled to the protection

11. 996 F.2d 1481 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that exclusion of murder
victim's prior violent act did not violate defendant's constitutional right to
present a defense), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1073 (1994).
12. Id. at 1482.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1481. Furthermore, the court stated that the right to present a
defense is not absolute, and may "'bow to accommodate other legitimate
interests in the criminal trial process.'" Id. at 1483 (quoting Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). However, the court added that
restrictions placed upon those interests may not be "'arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.'" Id. (quoting
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987)).
15. Id. at 1483-84 (holding that exclusion of evidence of victim's prior
criminal act did not violate defendant's constitutional right to present a defense

19941

CHARACTER EVIDENCE

of the criminal law, including protections against assault and
homicide. New York could legitimately decide that if evidence of
the victim's character were admitted, there is a risk that the jury
might decide improperly that this aggressive person, perhaps with
a history of violent acts, really got what he deserved. Therefore,
the jury would not properly evaluate the evidence considering the
defendant's claim of self-defense, but decide that despite that
claim, even if the defendant had not so acted, the victim's
character justifies or excuses the defendant's act.
The Second Circuit also noted that New York could
appropriately decide that a jury would likely overestimate the
significance of evidence regarding the aggressive character of the
victim. 16 Although relevant, it is not particularly probative. Just
because someone might have an aggressive or violent character
does not necessarily mean that he acted in conformity on a
particular occasion. 17 The propensity inference is relatively
weak.
Additionally, the Williams court noted that it was appropriate
for New York courts to make a policy decision not to get into the
matter of the victim's character because it introduces a potentially
collateral issue. 18 The victim's character here is not itself an
element of the charge or defense. It is some circumstantial
evidence of whether the victim was the first aggressor. But
raising the victim's character may involve the trial in an issue
that is peripheral to what the jury is ultimately going to be asked
to decide which is, of course, how the defendant and victim
behaved on this occasion, not whether the victim, in fact, had a
character trait for aggression or violence. In all, the low
probative value of the proof weighed against its potential for
because such propensity evidence has only "limited relevance" where such
evidence had no bearing on reasonableness of defendant's actions).
16. Id. at 1483. See People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 535 N.E.2d 250, 538

N.Y.S.2d 197 (1988) (holding that there is a danger that trier of fact would
overestimate the significance of the evidence).

17. Williams, 996 F.2d at 1483 ("New York has a legitimate interest in
seeing that every person, regardless of his worth to the community, is not

unlawfully assaulted.").
18. Id. at 1483-84.
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prejudice and confusion of the issue by raising a collateral matter
justifies New York's rule of exclusion.
The Williams court also noted a distinction initially drawn in
the Rodawald case between the situation present in Williams and
a situation in which the defendant knows of the victim's character
for aggression or violence. 19 If the defendant is aware of ,the
victim's character trait, she can prove it. The rationale is that in
the latter circumstance the evidence is much more probative. The
reasoning goes as follows. Here we are not talking about the
propensity inference from someone's character trait to action in
conformity on a particular occasion. We are talking about the
defendant's perception of the actions of the victim. Did the
defendant, for example, act in reasonable fear of imminent bodily
harm? How did the defendant interpret the actions of the victim?
New York courts have found evidence about the character of the
victim, if known to the defendant, far more probative. 20 We are
not talking about the propensity inference; we are talking about
what was known to the defendant and how that knowledge might
bear on the requisite state of mind for establishing his or her
claim of self-defense.
Under the federal rules, evidence of the victim's violent
character comes in simply to establish the propensity inference. 2 1
There is no requirement that the defendant be aware of this trait
of the victim. And in Williams, that was exactly the situation.
19. Id. at 1482.
20. See generally People v. Miller, 39 N.Y.2d 543, 349 N.E.2d 841, 384

N.Y.S.2d 741 (1976). In Miller, the court stated that "[k]nowledge of prior
violent acts of the victim may weigh heavily upon the mind a defendant when,
as asserted, he moved to blunt the aggression of the victim." Id. at 551, 349
N.E.2d at 847, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 748. The court, therefore, held that evidence

of prior acts of violence committed by the decedent is admissible when the
defense of justifiable homicide is asserted. Id.
21. See Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1045 (10th Cir. 1986)

(holding that evidence of decedent's character, though unknown by defendants
at time of incident, is admissible from which jury could infer propensity for
aggression); see also United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432, 434-35 n.4 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (holding that defendant's lack of knowledge regarding decedent's

character irrelevant; inquiry is "objective occurrence" and not subjective
belief).
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The defendant was not aware of the victim's violent propensity,
and where the federal courts admit character proof in this
situation, the New York courts exclude it.
How to evaluate the different approaches to start thinking about
which approach is preferable? A key point is to understand
precisely what is meant by the New York approach that
distinguishes the use of character evidence to establish propensity
and to establish the state of mind necessary to self-defense. As
the interpretation of New York law comes down to us, there is a
clear distinction between what is called the objective or
subjective use of the victim's character according to whether it is
used to prove what the victim probably did or what the defendant
probably thought he was going to do. New York law is said to
permit only the subjective use of the proof.2 2 But if you go back
to Rodaivald, the case does not say precisely that. 23 What it
seems to say is that once it is established that the defendant
pleading self-defense is aware of the victim's violent character,
the evidence can be admitted because it has become doubly
probative. It is relevant to whether the defendant was the first
aggressor and to the defendant's state of mind. Where doubly
relevant, the balance between probative value on the one hand
and prejudice, confusion and diversion on the other tips in favor
of admissibility. You can use the proof to show the defendant's
state of mind and the victim's propensity. As far as I can tell, this
aspect of Rodawald does not come down to us today; New York
cases continue to suggest that even when the proof comes in, it
does so solely to establish the defendant's state of mind. 24
22. See Miller, 39 N.Y.2d at 548-49, 349 N.E.2d at 845, 384 N.Y.S.2d at

745. The court in Miller reiterated that in a homicide prosecution, the
defendant may introduce evidence of the decedent's general reputation for
violence provided the defendant knew of that reputation. Id.
23. See generally Rodawald, 177 N.Y. 408, 70 N.E. 1.
24. See Miller, 39 N.Y.2d at 552, 349 N.E.2d at 847, 384 N.Y.S.2d at

746 ("ITIhe jury must be cautioned that this evidence may only be considered

with respect to the issue of the reasonableness of defendant's apprehensions.
and, further, that the character of the deceased and his specific past violent
acts are not otherwise relevant to the issues before them."): People v. Trivette.
175 A.D.2d 330, 332, 572 N.Y.S.2d 85, 87 (3d Dep't 1991) (holding
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In a curious way, Rodawald may be better justified than the
current New York rule. Rodawald seemed to identify a rather
specific set of circumstances, where victim character evidence is
relevant to the victim's likely action and the defendant's state of
mind, under which its probative value might well outweigh the
dangers of prejudice, confusion and diversion. 25 But as it seems
today to be understood, Rodawald stands for the proposition that
New York takes a purely subjective approach to victim character
evidence. 26 Under that subjective approach, the truth is that we
are not really talking about the character of the victim at all. If all
we care about is what the defendant perceives about the victim
for the light it sheds on the reasonableness of the defendant's
actions or his state of mind, then we do not even care if what the
defendant believes about the victim is true or not. What we care
about is the defendant's belief. If that is true, then you can
imagine that all kinds of evidence that seems to fall under the
rubric of victim character proof is not really character proof at
all. It may be admissible in a criminal trial solely to establish the
defendant's belief, be immune to rebuttal by evidence of the
victim's peaceable character, and thus have precisely the kinds of
prejudicial effects on the determination that commentators and
courts worry that it might have. At the same time, the evidence
would be shorn of its probative value as propensity proof.
Rodawald at least suggested a screen for the prejudice by
requiring that the evidence be doubly relevant before being
decedent's psychiatric evaluation inadmissible where defendant unaware of
such, could not have affected defendant's state of mind at time of incident).
25. Rodawald, 177 N.Y. at 423, 70 N.E. at 5-6. The court stated that a

defendant may introduce general reputation evidence of the decedent - "that of
a quarrelsome, vindictive or violent man" - as long as such reputation was
known to the defendant at the time of the homicide. Id.
26. Williams v. Lord, 996 F.2d 1481, 1484 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that it

was not error to exclude evidence of murder victim's prior violent acts since
defendant had no knowledge of such acts at time of homicide), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1073 (1994); In re Robert S., 52 N.Y.2d 1046, 420 N.E.2d 390,
438 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1981) (holding that general reputation evidence of decedent
to show quarrelsome or vindictive admissible, but excluded evidence of
general propensities for violence unless had bearing on defendant's state of
mind).
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admitted, and where it is admitted, it would be acknowledged to
be character proof and subject to rebuttal.
Having said that about the New York approach, I should add
something about the federal alternative. I suppose that in going
back to Rodawald, I am bucking the tide by suggesting that,
perhaps, there is a greater rationale for the New York approach
than many have suggested. For example, Judge Cardamone,
concurring in Williams, while agreeing that the New York rule
does not interfere with the defendant's constitutional right to
present a defense, urged the New York courts to reevaluate a rule
that he noted represents a "much criticized minority view."27
Nonetheless, it is not clear, as Judge Cardamone's suggestion
presupposed, that the federal rules would have allowed the proof.
Although Rule 404(a)(2) allows proof of a victim's violent
character to show that he was the first aggressor, Rule 40528
allows proof of that character only by reputation or opinion
evidence. 2 9 The proof in Williams, however, consisted of the
testimony of the victim's previous rape victim. It is hard to
imagine how the defendant could turn this single incident into
persuasive opinion or reputation proof, if she could do so at all.
The federal rules prohibit proof of character by specific acts,
despite their more probative nature, precisely because of their
additional tendency to prejudice, confuse or divert the jury's
attention from the central issue in the case at bar. Thus, even the
federal rules seem to exclude the proof in Williams for precisely
the same underlying reasons that the Rodawald court suggested.
27. Williams, 996 F.2d at 1484-85 (Cardamone, J., concurring).
28. FED. R. EvID. 405. Rule 405 provides:

(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or
a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by
testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion on
cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances
of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait
of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or
defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's
conduct.
Id.
29. Id.
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On the other hand, Judge Cardamone recognized what may
seem to many to be the compelling nature of the proof excluded
in Williams. There may be circumstances under which character
evidence established by specific acts seems far more probative
than the character rules allow, especially when it concerns
unusual acts of violence. To admit it, however, is to require a
more general overhaul of the character evidence rules, not the
simple amendment of the state rule to mirror the federal rule. In
this circumstance, the same factors that made the specific act
proof highly probative also rendered it especially likely to
prejudice, confuse or divert the jury. Where both probative value
and prejudicial effect are high, general evidentiary principles,
such as those embodied in Rule 403,30 admit the evidence. But
the categorical character evidence rules governing exclusion,
admission and method of proof combine to exclude evidence that
nonetheless meets the standard of Rule 403. Accommodating the
proof in Williams requires more than amending those categorical
rules to allow character proof of the victim.
In reevaluating New York's rule, New York courts should go
back to Rodawald itself and ask whether its rationale for the New
York approach is something that has been lost over the years and
is, perhaps, something worth reviving or continuing.
Alternatively, the courts should ask whether the character rules in
their entirety are in need of revision in favor of a flexible
standard that allows highly probative character evidence despite
its admitted potential for prejudice.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you, Professor Kainen.

30. FED. R. EvID. 403. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence

may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Id.

